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Abstract 
Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, technological change has led to the automation of 
existing tasks and the creation of new ones, as well as the reallocation of labor across occupations and 
industries. These processes have been costly to individual workers, but labor demand has remained 
strong, and real wages have steadily increased in line with productivity growth. I provide evidence 
suggesting, however, that in recent decades automation has outpaced the creation of new tasks and 
thus the demand for labor has declined. There is strong disagreement about the future of labor 
demand, and predictions about technological breakthroughs have a poor track record. Given the 
importance of overall labor demand for workers' standard of living as well as their ability to adjust to 
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1 Introduction
Concerns that new technologies may lead to large-scale job destruction and mass unemployment are
not new, but have recently resurfaced with renewed force in academic and policy debates as well as
in the media (Autor, 2015; Shiller, 2019). There is a consensus that for most of the past 250 years—
since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution—technology has been a blessing overall, driving the
spectacular rise in incomes and standards of living over this period (Jones, 2016). However, recent
advances in robotics and artificial intelligence lead some to suggest that this time is different—prospects
for less-skilled workers in particular are deteriorating, as automation threatens to proceed at a much
higher pace (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Ford, 2015), and the creation of new tasks appears to slow
down (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019b). Others suggest that the demand for middle-skill workers in
particular—who have lost out from recent technological change—may well pick up again (Autor, 2015).
Yet others question the ability of machine learning and robotics to deliver sustained productivity growth
(Gordon, 2012, 2014).
Technology affects the labor market in at least two distinct ways. First, the extent of automation
compared to the rate at which new types of jobs are created, determines overall labor demand relative
to the demand for capital (Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2019a). If the two forces proceed at the same pace,
overall labor demand will remain stable, and workers will share the gains from increased productivity.
Second, technology leads to the reallocation of labor across industries and occupations, imposing costs
on affected workers even when overall labor demand is unchanged. In this paper, I review existing
evidence and present new findings on both of these points.
In Section 2, I investigate how technology has affected the evolution of labor demand over the past
30 years. As is well-known, the share of GDP accruing to workers has been declining across the world
(Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014), but there is no consensus yet about the driving forces of this decline.
I use the decomposition method developed by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019a) to isolate the component
of changes in the labor share that is due to changes in task content, as opposed to changes in industry
composition or changes in factor inputs.
I find that in the US and across five large European economies, the change in task content from
1987-2007 is negative, implying that automation has outpaced the creation of new tasks over this period.
Moreover, the change in task content is of similar magnitude across countries, unlike raw changes in
the labor share. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019a) establish that their estimated task-content changes for
the US correlate with more direct measures of automation such as robot adoption. In addition, I find
that changes in task content in European industries are positively correlated with changes in the same
industries in the US; and again, this is not true for raw industry-level changes in labor shares. I also
discuss alternative explanations for the decline the in labor share, especially those related to a rise in
firms’ market power.
Even in an economy in which the rate of automation equals that of the creation of new tasks, tech-
nological change can be costly to individual workers. I discuss the reasons for this in Section 3, and
review some of the existing evidence. I report on ongoing research on the individual costs of occupa-
tional decline (Edin, Evans, Graetz, Hernnäs, and Michaels, 2019). A theme common to most research
on distributional aspects of technological change is that workers’ ability to cope with a changing labor
market depends critically on overall labor demand being strong.
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While governments have for a long time made efforts to predict employment growth at the level of
industries and particularly occupations, there is a lack of systematic efforts in forecasting the determi-
nants of overall labor demand, such as the rate of automation and the rate of creation of new tasks. This is
a formidable challenge as the relevant information—for instance, knowledge about imminent technolog-
ical breakthroughs and their likely applications—is widely dispersed. I argue in Section 4 that prediction
markets devoted to the forecasting of productivity growth, wage growth, and related variables may help
remedy the situation.
I offer concluding remarks, including a brief discussion of recent trends in labor supply, in Section 5.
2 Has demand for labor declined? If so, is technology to blame?
This section is concerned with changes in the share of GDP accruing to labor over the past few decades.
Movements in the labor share imply that growth in average wages diverges from productivity growth.
Denote average wages by w, output by Y , the size of the labor force by N, and the labor share by sN .
By definition, sN ≡ wN/Y . Therefore, wage growth is the sum of productivity growth and growth in the
labor share,
∆ logw︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage growth
= ∆ log(Y/N)︸ ︷︷ ︸
productivity growth
+ ∆ logsN︸ ︷︷ ︸
growth in the labor share
. (1)
A falling labor share implies that a higher rate of productivity growth is required to achieve a given rate
of wage growth. When productivity growth is slow by historical standards, a decline in the labor share is
thus especially bad news for workers’ welfare.
A falling labor share is also a strong indicator that the demand for labor is declining relative to the
demand for capital. The question then is where this decline in labor demand comes from.
I document a secular decline in the labor shares across five European countries and the US in Section
2.1. I provide evidence suggesting that this decline is at least partly driven by automation in Section 2.2,
and discuss alternative explanations for the decline in Section 2.3.
2.1 The declining labor share in Europe and the United States
Figure 1 plots the labor share over the period 1970-2007 for France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The choice of countries, as well as the highlighting of the
base year 1987 in the graphs, is dictated by data requirements for the analysis of Section 2.2, which
will decompose changes in the labor share from 1987-2007. The source for all data used in this paper
is the March 2011 release of EUKLEMS (Timmer, van Moergastel, Stuivenwold, Ypma, O’Mahony,
and Kangasniemi, 2007; O’Mahony and Timmer, 2009).1 I present two different measures of the labor
share. One is based on the earnings of employed workers (‘Employees’), while the other also includes
the earnings of the self-employed (‘All labor’). It is conceptually and practically difficult to divide the
earnings of the self-employed into labor and capital income (Krueger, 1999; Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin,
2013), so the employee-only measure may be preferable. For completeness, I will report results for both
measures throughout.



















































Notes: The figures plot the shares of GDP received by employees (‘Employees’) and by all labor, including the self-employed
(‘All labor’), over time. Source: EUKLEMS.
Figure 1: The labor share over time
Figure 1 shows a secular decline in the labor share in all six countries, regardless of the measure
considered. The decline is not monotone, and its timing differs across countries, nevertheless a downward
trend is visible everywhere.2
Due to differences in levels and volatility of the labor share series, the precise magnitudes of the
decline are easier to discern when plotting percentage point (pp) changes relative to a base year. This is
done in Figure 2. The labor share, including only employees’ compensation, has declined by 2-3pp from
1987-2007 in all countries considered except Germany, where the decline was much larger at around
8pp. However, Germany’s labor share was higher in 1987 than in 1970, whereas for the other countries
there was also a decline from 1970-1987.3 The labor share series that includes self-employed as well
mostly shows similar patterns, except in the cases of France and Italy, where the broader measure shows
a substantially larger decline.
2Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) perform statistical tests for a large set of countries, including the ones I focus on here,
and find that the decline in the labor share in most cases is unlikely due to random variation around a constant long-run value.
3The lack of US data for much of the 1970s is due to efforts by the authors of EUKLEMS to make data comparable. I
speculate that this also explains why the labor share decline for the US shown here is somewhat smaller than reported in the
literature (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014, for instance). Reassuringly, my decomposition results for the US in Section 2.2































































Notes: The figures plot the shares of GDP received by employees (‘Employees’) and by all labor, including the self-employed
(‘All labor’), over time. Each series is normalized to zero in 1987. Source: EUKLEMS.
Figure 2: Changes in the labor share, in percentage points relative to 1987
2.2 Is technology to blame for the falling labor share?
I will use the constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production function, a familiar tool in macroe-
conomics, to illustrate the forces that could potentially cause changes in the labor share. The CES















AK and AN denote factor-augmenting technologies, and σ is the elasticity of substitution. The interpre-
tation of α ∈ (0,1) is to be thoroughly discussed below, but for now I treat it as a fixed parameter, as is
standard in the literature. Suppose that there are many perfectly competitive firms hiring capital and labor
at rates r and w—the rental price of capital and the wage, respectively—and combining these factors to











Equation (3) suggests that changes in the labor share are due to changes in the ratio of effective factor
prices r/AKw/AN . A change in this ratio induces firms to adjust their capital-labor ratios—as capital becomes
relatively cheaper (more expensive) firms use more (less) capital relative to labor.4 What this does to the
labor share depends on the elasticity of substitution σ . If σ > 1, factors are easily substitutable, so that
a fall in the (effective) rental rate is more than offset by the increased use of capital, and the labor share
declines. But if σ < 1, firms only modestly increase the use of capital in response to a lower rental rate,
and the labor share actually increases.
If σ = 0, a change in relative factor prices will have no effect on the labor share. In this case the
production function (2) collapses to the Cobb-Douglas form Y = (AKK)α(ANN)1−α , and the labor share
is equal to 1−α . This is why α is often referred to as a ‘share parameter’ in the literature. Indeed, the
labor share is a fixed quantity in many macroeconomic models as σ = 1 is a common assumption. But
this contradicts the evidence shown in Section 2.1. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) propose to allow
for σ 6= 1, while keeping α fixed, and show that changes in factor prices—in particular, a falling rental
rate—together with σ > 1 are capable of explaining the falling labor share. However, much independent
econometric evidence suggests that σ < 1. The alternative, then, is to allow α to change. This is the
approach taken by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019a), and the one that I will pursue here.
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019a, henceforth AR) do not start with (2). Instead, their point of departure
is the observation that production requires the completion of tasks (AR, p6):
The production of a shirt, for example, starts with a design, then requires the completion of a variety of pro-
duction tasks, such as the extraction of fibers, spinning them to produce yarn, weaving, knitting, dyeing, and
processing, as well as additional nonproduction tasks, including accounting, marketing, transportation, and
sales. Each one of these tasks can be performed by human labor or by capital (including both machines and
software). The allocation of tasks to factors determines the task content of production.
Automation enables some of the tasks previously performed by labor to be produced by capital.










The different tasks are indexed by z ∈ Z, and task outputs Y (z) are combined to make the final good Y
via a CES production function. The set of tasks Z may change over time, as I discuss below.
How exactly are tasks completed? AR assume that all tasks can be performed by labor, but only
a subset can be performed by capital (machines). The state of technology determines the size of this



















and perfect competition ensures that all output accrues to capital and labor (there are no pure profits), so that sN = 1/(1+
rK/(wN)). This together with the FOC then leads to (3). Alternatively, the labor share can be expressed in terms of the ratio of















The way in which effective factor uses affect the labor share is analogous to that of effective factor prices as discussed in the
main text, which is due to the one-to-one relationship between relative factor prices and uses given by the FOC.
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subset, that is, the fraction of tasks that can be automated. AR further assume that the effective rental
price of capital is sufficiently below the effective wage, so that firms will always automate tasks whose
automation is feasible. Once factors have been assigned to tasks, output can be expressed as a function of
capital and labor exactly as in (2), up to a re-scaling. Crucially, AR show that α can now be interpreted
as the share of tasks performed by machines, and hence 1−α as the task share performed by labor.5 If
further automation becomes feasible due to technological progress, α increases. And so, according to
(3), automation causes the labor share to decline.
There are several reasons why the task framework may be preferable to a model that directly links
output to factor inputs as in (2). First, the task framework allows for a straightforward as well as realistic
way of modeling automation, namely, by increasing the share of tasks that can be performed by capital.
Second, this framework allows for technology to increase productivity of capital or labor differentially
across tasks. In contrast, in the simple CES model of (2) an increase in AK or AN implies improved
productivity of these factors regardless of their use. Third, as shown by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018),
wages could actually decrease as a result of technological progress—increased automation—in the task
framework, whereas improved technologies will always lead to higher wages in the simple CES model.6
Fourth, the task framework allows for an additional force, namely the introduction of new tasks (an
expansion of the set Z) due to technological progress. This is of great empirical relevance—think of
tasks such as web design, piloting aircrafts, analysing large datasets, or performing transplant surgery.
The introduction of new tasks will cause the fraction of tasks performed by labor, α , to increase assuming
that humans have a comparative advantage in such new tasks, as seems empirically plausible. AR call
this the reinstatement effect, which counteracts the displacement effect that is due to automation.7
I now take the task framework to the data in order to investigate the drivers of the decline in the labor
share in the six countries. I implement the method suggested by AR, which requires industry-level panel
data on value added, labor and capital inputs, as well as factor prices and allows for a decomposition of
wage bill growth into several distinct components. Suppose that the production function in industry i,
















Of course, I maintain the interpretation that this production function ultimately depends on an underlying







. The set of tasks Z may vary across industries,
countries, and over time, as may be the case for the subset of tasks that can be automated. Hence, αict
may vary accordingly. I restrict factor-augmenting technologies to be constant across industries in a
given country and year, and the substitution elasticity to be constant across all countries, industries, and
years.
5More precisely, α is the weighted share of tasks performed by machines, where the weights are a function of capital’s and
labor’s productivity in each task.
6For related results on technological change and wages, see Caselli and Manning (forthcoming).
7The task framework also gives rise to a different interpretation of the substitution elasticity σ in the aggregate production
function. If (2) is the starting point of the model, then σ captures the substitutability of capital versus labor. However, if (2)
instead results from (4), then σ actually measures substitutability across different tasks. As the above quote as well as further
introspection may suggest, task substitutability is likely to be low in reality. However, there currently exist no econometric
estimates of σ when interpreted in this way.
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Recall that according to (1), the growth (change in the log) of the economy-wide average wage can be
written as the sum of productivity growth and growth in the labor share. Productivity growth may be af-
fected by automation, factor-augmenting technological change, and the introduction of new tasks. Since
my interest here is in explaining deviations of wage growth from productivity growth, I do not investigate
the precise sources of productivity growth. Instead, I focus on changes in the labor share. These changes
in the labor share, as shown by AR, can be decomposed into a composition effect, a substitution effect,
and the change in task content. The composition effect is due to reallocation of economic activity across
industries over time, and it will be important if the labor share differs across industries. The substitution
effect comes from firms’ responses to changes in relative effective factor prices; substitution effects are
allowed to differ across industries, and the decomposition uses an employment-weighted sum of these
industry-level effects. Finally, the change in task content is due to advances in automation as well as the
introduction of new tasks. It is also allowed to vary across industries, and an employment-weighted sum
is used in the decomposition. In sum, the decomposition of wage growth I will carry out can be written
as8
Change in log average wage = Productivity effect
+ Composition effect + Substitution effect
+ Change in task content.
(6)
I leave the formal statement and derivation of this decomposition to the appendix, and provide here
an informal description. For the left-hand side, the average wage is calculated as the labor share times
GDP (value added) divided by population, and its growth rate (log change) is computed. On the right-
hand side, the productivity effect is simply the growth in GDP per capita;9 the composition effect is
calculated using each industry’s labor share and each industry’s value added share in overall GDP; and
computing the substitution effect requires industry-level labor shares, wages, rental prices, and quality-
adjusted labor and capital inputs, as well as assumptions on the elasticity of substitution and the growth
rate of factor-augmenting technology—following AR, I choose σ = 0.8 and set the growth rate of AN/AK
equal to each country’s average productivity growth.10 Finally, and most importantly, the change in task
content in each industry is estimated as the change in the industry’s labor share minus the substitution
effect. The industry-level changes are then added up (weighting by employment shares) to obtain the
aggregate change in task content.11
The validity of the decomposition rests on several assumptions. First, product and factor markets
must be perfectly competitive, although perfect factor mobility across industries is not required: factor
prices are allowed to vary across industries. Second, the production function is of the CES form (5).
Third, firms’ factor use is consistent with profit maximization. Although trade is not explicitly modeled,
8I use the terms ‘productivity effect’ and ‘productivity growth’ interchangeably.
9To obtain wages and productivity I divide by population instead of the number of people employed, following AR. This
is because declining labor shares and slow productivity growth may induce lower labor force participation, in which case per-
worker measures understate the welfare implications of such secular trends. The calculations of composition effect, substitution
effect, and change in task content are unaffected by this choice.
10See AR (p13) for a discussion of these choices, including estimates of σ from the literature.
11AR also show that under further and arguably strong assumptions, the change in the task content can be decomposed into
an automation component (the displacement effect) and a new-tasks component (the reinstatement effect). Here I focus on the
net effect only.
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the economy is not required to be closed, as long as changes in openness to trade are reflected in changes
to goods prices and factor prices.12 Finally, the framework abstracts from worker heterogeneity, but

























































































Notes: The figures plot the results from the decomposition (6) which is due to Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019a). The labor
share used in the calculations is based on earnings of employees, excluding earnings of the self-employed.
Figure 3: Decomposition of wage growth (employees)
I implement the decomposition using the EUKLEMS data. In each of the six countries, there are
27 industries, covering the entire economy. Due to data availability constraints, I choose 1987 as the
base year for my decomposition, and 2007 as the final year. Figure 3 presents the results, focusing
on labor income as measured by compensation of employees (using all labor earnings, including those
of the self-employed, yields very similar results, as shown in Figure A1). All series plotted represent
differences in logs relative to the base year 1987. It is clear that wages in all six countries grew less
than productivity, which of course reflects the falling labor share. Furthermore, the composition effect
tends to be negative, implying that employment has moved into industries with lower labor shares. This
is especially pronounced in Germany and Italy, and partly accounts for the larger labor share decline
in these countries. There is a small positive substitution effect in all countries. Rental prices relative
to wages have declined, and with an elasticity of substitution below one this contributes positively to
12An exception to this is offshoring, which may directly affect the task content of production. See the discussion below.
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wage growth. Finally, and most importantly, in all countries the change in task content is estimated to be
negative. In terms of the theoretical framework, this means that automation has outpaced the creation of
new tasks, in other words, that the displacement effect has dominated the reinstatement effect. Moreover,
the magnitude of the task content change is similar in all countries at around minus ten percent, except
in France, where the decline is less than five percent.13
Taking the results of the decomposition at face value, it appears that technology has indeed con-
tributed to the decline in the labor share, and to a similar extent across countries. However, it is possible
that the estimated change in task content does not in fact capture technological change but something
else, especially given that it is essentially a residual (albeit with a clear theoretical interpretation). To ad-
dress this concern, AR document that in the US, industries with larger declines (negative changes) in task
content have also adopted industrial robots at a higher rate, and had a higher initial routine employment
share, both widely accepted measures of exposure to automation (Graetz and Michaels, 2018; Acemoglu
and Restrepo, 2017; Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003). They also find that offshoring is correlated with
changes in task content, but controlling for offshoring only marginally affects the relationship between
changes in task content and more direct measures of automation. The finding that since 1987, automation
appears to have outpaced the creation of new tasks, marks a break with previous trends. AR find that
from 1948-1987, the two forces cancelled each other out in the US.
Table 1: Industry-level changes in labor share and task content, Europe versus the United States
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Changes in task content
Change in US 0.50 0.32 0.23 0.21
(0.20) (0.090) (0.087) (0.081)
B. Changes in the labor share
Change in US 0.14 0.030 -0.033 -0.040
(0.18) (0.093) (0.059) (0.058)
Outlier removed X X
Weighted by initial employment share X X
Observations 135 134 135 134
Notes: Results are shown from regressions of changes in task content and labor shares 1987-2007 in 27 industries across
five European countries against changes in task content in the same industries in the US. Robust standard errors, clustered
by industry, in parentheses.
Having implemented the decomposition for the same industries across different countries, I am able
to carry out an important additional check. As technology adoption follows broadly similar patterns
across countries, it is to be expected that the estimated changes in task content correlate positively within
the same industry across countries. To test this, I use the US as a benchmark and pool the five European
countries. I then regress for each of the 27 industries in the European countries the change in task content
on the change in the corresponding industry in the US. The results are shown in panel A of Table 1. In
13The labor share in France appears to have declined more strongly when taking into account self-employed earnings, and
using this measure leads to a larger (in magnitude) estimated change in the task content, see Figure A1.
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the full sample, a 1-percent task content change in a US industry is associated with a 0.5-percent change
in the same industry in the five European countries (column (1)). However, this association is likely
sensitive to an extreme outlier (Figure A3). Removing this outlier indeed reduces the coefficient (column
(2)). Alternatively, weighting the regression by each industry’s initial within-country employment share
also leads to a lower association. Conservatively, I conclude that a 1-percent task content change in a
US industry is associated with a 0.2-percent change in the same industry in Europe (columns (3)-(4)).
Remarkably, the raw industry-level changes in the labor share do not appear to co-move across countries
in the same way (panel B). Thus, the changes in task content estimated by the AR method do seem to
isolate a driving force that is related to technology and common across countries, more so than the raw
changes in labor shares.14
The results presented here are also consistent with independent evidence on regional differences in
robot adoption within Germany. Dauth, Findeisen, Suedekum, and Woessner (2018) find that in regions
that adopted industrial robots at a higher rate from 1994-2014, the labor share in total regional income
declined more.
Of the assumptions which are required for the decomposition to be valid, that of perfectly competitive
output and factor markets is most likely to be violated in practice. In the following section I discuss
whether changes in market power might explain the fall in the labor share instead.
2.3 Alternative explanations for the falling labor share
There are several alternative explanations for the decline in the labor share besides changes in task con-
tent. Recall that Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) put forward an explanation based on the decline in
the relative effective price of capital. Their explanation also puts technology center stage, as the declin-
ing price of equipment capital in particular is plausibly linked to technological advances such as personal
computers and industrial robots (Nordhaus, 2007; Graetz and Michaels, 2018). However, recent research
has suggested explanations that are less closely related to technological change, and these explanations
have focussed on several aspects of changes in market power.
So far, my conceptual framework has assumed perfectly competitive firms, so that all income either
accrues to labor or capital. However, in reality firms do earn pure profits.15 According to Barkai (2017),
the share of profits in US GDP has increased from 5 to 15 percent from 1985-2015, and this has not only
come at the expense of labor, but even more so, at the expense of capital. Suppose that profits are due to
product market power, and further suppose that such market power does not affect firms’ relative factor










where sΠ is the share of profits in GDP. Everything else equal, the presence of pure profits implies a
14All results related to the decomposition exercise are very similar when using the labor share measure that includes self-
employed earnings. See Figures A1, Table A1, and Figure A3.
15Separating pure profits from capital income is however very challenging in practice. The EUKLEMS data, which I have
used in this paper, actually treat all non-labor income as capital income. It is therefore not possible to study trends in profit
shares using these data.
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lower labor share. Furthermore, under commonly made assumptions the aggregate profit share is directly
related to product market power, sΠ = 1−1/µ , where µ is the markup that firms charge over marginal
costs.16 This suggests that changes in the profit share may be driven by changes in markups, which could
be, for instance, due to increased market concentration.
Indeed, De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) measure markups using firm-level data and find that
markups in the US increased from 20 percent over marginal cost in 1980 to 65 percent today. De Loecker
and Eeckhout (2018) document similar trends for most regions of the world. De Loecker and Eeckhout
(2017) explore the implications of rising markups for the labor share, as do Eggertsson, Robbins, and
Wold (2018). However, Traina (2018) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2018) discuss measurement is-
sues related to markup estimation using firm-level data, and argue that markups appear to be stable under
alternative, not necessarily less defensible assumptions. Moreover, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2018)
highlight that the estimation of profit shares requires accurate measures of both capital rental prices and
capital services. They argue that rental prices have likely been mismeasured, and that the rise in the profit
share is thus overstated.
While there appears to be no consensus yet about recent trend in markups, researchers largely agree
that there has been a rise in concentration—both in terms of employment and sales—in most industries at
the national level in the US since the early 1980s (Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Trachter, 2018). Increased
concentration seems to be driven by the largest firms in an industry becoming more dominant. Since
these large firms tend to have lower payroll-to-sales ratios, increased concentration accounts for part of
the fall in the labor share (Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen, 2017).
A related issue which has recently received attention is local concentration of employment and the
wage setting power of firms. While higher local concentration is associated with lower wages (Azar,
Marinescu, Steinbaum, and Taska, 2018), local concentration has actually decreased in the US (Lipsius,
2018; Rinz, 2018). This appears to be driven by the same forces as the increase in concentration at the
national level, as entry of large firms in a local labor market in fact leads to lower concentration (Rossi-
Hansberg, Sarte, and Trachter, 2018) locally. Trends in local concentration and increased monopsony
power thus cannot explain the falling labor share or rising inequality. Instead, what matters is that large
firms, where the labor share tends to be lower, have grown even larger in relative terms (Autor, Dorn,
Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen, 2017).
2.4 Summary
There is evidence suggesting that technological change—in particular, automation outpacing the creation
of new tasks—has driven the decline in the labor share. In this sense, the overall demand for labor relative
to capital has indeed declined, and technology appears to be the culprit. While my estimates of changes
in task content require several strong assumptions to be interpretable as resulting from technological
change, I do not find it plausible to view them as driven by changes in market power instead, since they
correlate with independent measures of automation and co-move across countries.
There also is evidence suggesting that the increasing dominance of large firms accounts for the de-






ε−1 and that each variety j is produced by a
monopolistically competitive firm facing the CES production function (2). Then equations (7) and sΠ = 1−1/µ hold, and the
markup is µ = (ε−1)/ε , with ε > 1.
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cline in the labor share, but this is not necessarily in contradiction to technological change playing an
important role. The increased market share of the largest firms may itself be driven by technological
change, and reallocation of workers across firms within an industry may be a relevant mechanism for
how changes in task content materialize in practice. The relationship between technological changes and
increased market concentration is a matter for future research.
3 Technological change, reallocation of labor, and the distribution of labor earnings
The previous section focussed on changes in aggregate labor demand, which manifest themselves in
changes in the economy-wide labor share. In this section I focus instead on how technology affects
the composition of labor demand—what type of labor, in which industries or occupations, benefits or is
harmed by new technologies.
Shifts in the demand for labor services between different industries, occupations, and firms have
been a feature of economic development at least since the start of the industrial revolution. One of the
most salient examples is the shift of employment out of agriculture into manufacturing, and from there
into services, commonly referred to as structural change (Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi, 2014).
Technology has played a direct role in this process, for instance by automating many aspects of farming
and industrial production; as well as an indirect one, as rising productivity caused rising incomes, which
in turn induced consumers to shift their expenditure from food and goods to services. In any case,
structural change implies a vast reallocation of workers across industries, and, because the nature of
work differs between sectors, also across occupations. Reallocation of workers across firms is in fact
a general feature of economic growth, even in the absence of sectoral shifts, since productivity growth
comes about through a process of creative destruction, whereby some firms are forced out of business by
more innovative competitors (Aghion, Akcigit, and Howitt, 2014).
Because labor markets in reality feature search frictions and asymmetric information, the process of
reallocation implies that there are losers as well as winners from technological progress. I review some
of the evidence on the costs of sudden job displacement, due to plant closures, in Section 3.1. In contrast
to such mass layoffs, occupational decline represents a more gradual deterioration of the demand for a
worker’s skills. In ongoing research, my co-authors and I find that it can nevertheless be costly. I report
on this research in Section 3.2.
Aside from reallocation of jobs, technological change affects inequality when it causes changes in
the demand for tasks and skills. I discuss how this process has played out over the past 40 years in
Section 3.3.
Throughout this part of the paper, my aim is to characterize not only the distributional aspects of
technological change, but also the ways in which workers adjust to adverse shocks, and how workers’
adjustment opportunities are affected by aggregate labor demand.
3.1 The costs of sudden job loss
A large literature has investigated workers’ earnings losses following displacement due to plant closure.
These losses are typically both large and persistent. Earnings losses following displacement are espe-
cially severe for workers with long tenure (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan, 1993) and older workers
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(Gathmann, Helm, and Schönberg, 2018). In contrast, displaced workers who manage to stay in the
same firm or occupation suffer smaller losses (Huttunen, Moen, and Salvanes, 2011; Kambourov and
Manovskii, 2009).
Importantly, the aggregate level of labor demand matters for the earnings losses of displaced work-
ers. Davis and Von Wachter (2011) find that in the US, losses are twice as high in recessions than in
expansions: when the national unemployment rate is less than 6 percent, men lose about 1.5 years of pre-
displacement earnings (in present value terms) while they lose almost 3 years when the unemployment
rate is above 8 percent. In a similar vein, Bana (2019) documents longer joblessness and larger earnings
losses for displaced workers who face a shrinking demand for their occupation. These findings suggest
that if technology were to further depress labor demand, the costs incurred by displaced workers would
be substantially larger (at the same time, displacement would likely become more frequent).
3.2 The individual costs of occupational decline
In ongoing research (Edin, Evans, Graetz, Hernnäs, and Michaels, 2019) we explore the consequences
of occupational decline for workers’ careers. We begin by identifying occupations that have declined
sharply during the last 30 years and determine whether their decline was due to technological replacement
using the Occupational Outlook Handbook (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1986, 2017, OOH). We classify
occupations as having declined if their employment in the US contracted by more than 25 percent. We
then map this information to Swedish occupations in order to study how occupational decline affects
individual workers, using data on the entire Swedish population at annual frequency 1985-2013.17 We
are also able to assess to what extent occupational decline was anticipated, using forecasts contained in
the OOH, as well as the size and past growth of Swedish occupations (which strongly predict growth
1985-2013).
Although occupational decline represents a more gradual fall in demand compared to say a mass lay-
off, we do find substantial costs for workers who in 1985 worked in a subsequently declining occupation.
Over a period of 28 years, these workers have 2-5 percent lower cumulative earnings than comparable
workers in non-declining jobs. And for workers at the bottom of the within-occupation earnings dis-
tribution, the losses are even larger at 8-11 percent.18 Furthermore, workers exposed to occupational
decline are less likely to still be working in their initial occupation in 2013. This is noteworthy because
over a nearly 30-year period, occupations could decline dramatically simply by taking in fewer younger
workers and via regular retirements. We also find that occupational decline is associated with increased
unemployment and publicly sponsored retraining. Our baseline results focus on all occupations that
have declined, but we find very similar results when focusing on occupations whose decline was directly
linked to technological change.
Occupational mobility is in principle a mechanism that may help workers mitigate their earnings
17It is much more challenging to track employment changes for hundreds of different occupations in Sweden than in the
US, because Swedish occupational classifications have changed substantially. However, at the level of detail at which we
are able to consistently measure occupational employment in Sweden, we do see a strong association between our US-based
indicator of decline and actual Swedish employment changes. Furthermore, studying the effects of occupational decline in the
US is challenging given the lack of large longitudinal data sets. Nonetheless, we replicate our analysis using data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. These results are much less precise than the Swedish ones, but lead to broadly similar
conclusions.
18We give a range of estimates based on a several reasonable regression specifications.
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losses from occupational decline. However, workers in declining occupations may also be more exposed
to displacement, and given labor market frictions, may find themselves making occupational moves that
are associated with higher earnings losses than incurred by those who manage to stay. We do not find
that movers out of declining occupations do better than stayers in those same occupations. However,
it is likely that a high rate of occupational mobility helps to reduce earnings losses because of general
equilibrium effects, as it implies an upward-sloping occupational supply curve.
We also investigate the timing of earnings losses due to occupational decline. Workers who started
out in subsequently declining occupations had lower earnings in all years, with the difference tending to
grow larger over time. However, earnings losses were especially severe during the 1990s recession.
3.3 Task-biased technological change and its implications for inequality
Since the early 1980s, highly-educated workers in most developed countries have enjoyed a sustained
increase in relative wages, even as educated labor has become more abundant. A large literature has
provided evidence that the introduction of information and communication technology (ICT)—for in-
stance, the personal computer—is the main reason behind this increased demand for skill (Acemoglu,
2002). A similarly sizeable literature (Autor, Levy, and Murnane, 2003; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011)
has demonstrated that ICT substitutes for some tasks but complements others, and that highly-educated
workers benefit from ICT because they traditionally perform the tasks which are complemented by it.
When viewed up close, the impact of new technologies on the demand for tasks and skills appears
more complicated than a simple story of skill-biased technological change would suggest. First, the oc-
cupations which have seen the largest declines in employment shares since 1980 are in fact middle-skill,
middle-wage occupations such as office clerks and machine operators. This hollowing-out of occupa-
tional employment, commonly referred to as job polarization, has been observed in most industrialized
countries (Goos and Manning, 2007; Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2006; Goos, Manning, and Salomons,
2014), and the leading explanation is that ICT is particularly suited to automate the tasks that workers
traditionally performed in middle-wage occupations. A complementary explanation emphasizes the eco-
nomic incentives of firms to automate tasks. Firms would like to replace workers who are expensive,
but replacing the most-skilled is not yet technologically feasible. Since the technological complexity of
tasks performed by the least-skilled does not differ very much compared to middle-skilled workers,19
firms may be induced by economic incentives to adopt automation technologies mainly in middle-wage
occupations. In Feng and Graetz (forthcoming), we illustrate this mechanism using a formal economic
model, and provide evidence of its relevance for job polarization in the US.20
Second, there is a multitude of skills that are valued in the labor market, and their returns have
evolved differentially. For instance, in the US the returns to social and non-cognitive skills have increased
relative to the returns to cognitive skills (Deming, 2017), and similar patterns are found for Sweden
(Edin, Fredriksson, Nybom, and Öckert, 2017). Returns to manual skills have decreased (Taber and
Roys, 2017). These changes in returns are closely linked to changes in task demand (Cortes, 2016;
Böhm, 2018). That is, occupations requiring social and non-cognitive skills have grown in importance,
19Low-skilled tasks such as cleaning offices or waiting tables are quite complex from an engineering perspective (Moravec,
1988).
20Barany and Siegel (2018), using a multi-sector growth model, show that job polarization can also be explained by structural
change.
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whereas occupations intensive in manual skills have declined. The rise of cognitive-skill-intensive jobs
seems to have stopped (Beaudry, Green, and Sand, 2016).
Changing task and skill returns are an important driver of changes in wage structures. Thus, techno-
logical change does not only account for the increased demand for highly-educated workers (Michaels,
Natraj, and Van Reenen, 2014), but also for part of the narrowing gender pay gap, as women tend to have
higher non-cognitive and social skills (Black and Spitz-Oener, 2010; Beaudry and Lewis, 2014).
Although the development and adoption of new technology often appears to be a gradual process,
technology-induced changes in skill and task demands tend to speed up during cyclical downturns. For
instance, much of the decline in middle-wage employment in the US over the past 40 years was concen-
trated in the last three recessions (Jaimovich and Siu, forthcoming). This may make it more difficult for
workers to adjust to a declining demand for their skills.
3.4 Summary
Reallocation of labor across industries and occupations, directly or indirectly linked to technological
change, can be costly for individual workers. As might be expected, sudden job loss due to plant closures
implies particularly large earnings losses. But even relatively gradual processes such as occupational de-
cline lead to substantial losses. Part of the reason may be that such otherwise gradual declines in demand
speed up during cyclical downturns, when workers are in a bad position to cope with displacement. Tech-
nological change creates winners and losers not only because of reallocation processes, but also because
it affects the demand for different tasks and skills.
4 Predicting better
Given striking technological advances such as machine learning and robotics, and given a declining
labor share and associated mediocre wage growth, policy makers and the public more generally are un-
derstandably concerned about the adverse consequences of automation. The findings reported in Section
2 unfortunately do not alleviate such concerns. However, as noted in the introduction, experts disagree
on the expected labor market impact of new technologies over the next few decades. Among those who
expect rapid technological progress, some worry about the implications for the average worker (Bryn-
jolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Ford, 2015), while others appear more optimistic (Autor, 2015). And there
are those who are not even confident in the ability of machine learning and robotics to deliver sustained
productivity growth (Gordon, 2012, 2014).
What is one to make of such disparate views? Is the future of labor demand really as uncertain as
these disagreements suggest? Again, it is useful to distinguish between overall labor demand on one
hand and shifts in labor demand, especially between different occupations, on the other.
Forecasting occupational demand has a long tradition in economic and policy research. Policy mak-
ers have sought to provide detailed and up-to-date projections of employment growth, as well as guidance
about what types of skills can be expected to remain in demand. Examples include the forecasts by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) discussed above, the O*NET project sponsored by the US Department
of Labor, and the Skills Forecast conducted by the European Centre for the Development of Vocational
Training. The BLS forecasts have proved quite accurate in forecasting occupational employment trends
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not only in the US (Veneri, 1997) but also in Sweden (Edin, Evans, Graetz, Hernnäs, and Michaels,
2019). This is testament both to the quality of the forecasts as well as to the fact that labor demand shifts
follow very similar patterns across countries.
But what about projections for overall labor demand? As argued in Section 3, workers’ ability
to adjust to shifts in labor demand—for instance, between occupations—depends critically on overall
labor demand remaining strong. Thus, obtaining accurate projections on this question, in addition to
occupation-level forecasts, should be a high priority for policy makers.
The task framework suggests that forecasting overall labor demand essentially requires predicting
how the pace of automation will compare to the rate at which new tasks are created. Recent research has
produced forecasts of the former. Frey and Osborne (2017) estimate that about 50 percent of employment
in the US is threatened by automation over the coming decades, while Arntz, Gregory, and Zierahn (2017)
arrive at only about 10 percent using a similar methodology that takes into account within-occupation
variation in task content. Predictions about the arrival of human-level artificial intelligence—which
would imply that all existing tasks could feasibly be automated (though firms would likely not find
it profitable to do so)—have proved unreliable, possibly because experts face perverse incentives in
making these predictions. Armstrong and Sotala (2015) document that experts most commonly predict
AI to arrive 15-25 years from the date the prediction is made. This range is convenient, because it helps
an expert to justify that they are working on something important, while at the same time not running the
risk to soon be proven wrong.
Predictions about the creation of new tasks are implicit in predictions about the net effect of tech-
nology on labor demand. In 2017, a panel of expert economists were asked to evaluate the statement
“Holding labor market institutions and job training fixed, rising use of robots and artificial intelligence
is likely to increase substantially the number of workers in advanced countries who are unemployed for
long periods”. 38 percent agreed, 33 disagreed, and 29 percent were uncertain.21
Producing more reliable predictions about the evolution of overall labor demand requires incorpo-
rating research findings, conceptual insights, and widely dispersed private information about imminent
innovations. Surveying experts’ forecasts or polling them directly is helpful, but even better would be to
leverage market forces.
Imagine a contract paying out e1 if real wages in the European Union grow less than productivity
on average from 2020-2025.22 If such a contract can be freely traded, its price will be informative about
market participants’ beliefs. In particular, under risk neutrality and if the efficient market hypothesis
holds, the price of the contract reveals the markets’ expectation of the probability that wage growth will
lag productivity growth.
The use of prediction markets for economic forecasting is advocated by Snowberg, Wolfers, and
Zitzewitz (2013, SWZ). They argue that prediction markets produce accurate forecasts for three reasons,
and note their superiority over alternative methods (SWZ, p661):
First, the market mechanism is essentially an algorithm for aggregating information. Second, as superior infor-
mation will produce monetary rewards, there is a financial incentive for truthful revelation. Third, and finally,
the existence of a market provides longer term incentives for specialization in discovering novel information
and trading on it. While these facets are inherent in any market, other forecasting mechanisms, such as polling,
21See http://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/robots-and-artificial-intelligence.
22The contract would specify the precise data sources and release dates.
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or employing professional forecasters, lacks one or more of them. For example, polling lacks incentives for
truthful revelation, and professional forecasters may have other motivations than simply forecast accuracy.
SWZ document prediction markets’ accuracy, their ability to quickly incorporate new information,
their lack of arbitrage opportunities, and robustness to manipulation, despite the presence of some be-
havioral biases. While most existing prediction markets are devoted to politics and sports, they have also
been used to forecast economic variables such as retail sales and unemployment claims. In these cases,
prediction markets weakly outperformed survey forecasts.23
SWZ also explain how alternative contracts can be used to elicit a variety of statistical moments,
for instance, the expected rate of real wage growth, or its standard deviation. The latter, in turn, is an
indicator of the uncertainty of market-based forecasts.
For the purpose of forecasting labor demand, several contracts could be designed tied to future wage
growth, productivity growth, occupational employment growth, or the emergence of new occupations.
The latter could, for instance, relate to revisions of official occupational classifications, with the share of
employment under new occupational titles being the object to be forecast.
Despite its advantages, prediction markets are not yet as common as economists would like them to
be. One reason may be legal barriers related to the regulation of gambling (Arrow et al., 2008). Another
challenge is that for prediction markets to function, they must attract both experts and noise traders in
sufficient numbers, so the subject must be interesting to many. In the case of forecasting medium and
long term labor demand, the public interest indeed appears to be enormous. Furthermore, one may hope
that people engaged in the development of new technologies would be enthusiastic about such a project,
given its innovative nature. On the other hand, long maturity of contracts may pose a challenge to
maintaining liquidity. If this challenge can be overcome, however, prediction markets promise to deliver
more accurate forecasts about the future evolution of labor demand than what is currently available.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I have reviewed existing evidence and presented new findings on the recent evolution of
labor demand. For most of the past 250 years, wages have grown at the pace of productivity, and thus
increased prosperity has been widely shared. However, recent decades have seen a declining labor share,
and the evidence suggests that this is at least partly due to automation outpacing the creation of new tasks.
I have also highlighted that reallocation of labor across industries and occupations imposes substantial
costs on individual workers, and that these costs are particularly large when overall labor demand is
weak. There appears to be no consensus among experts about the future evolution of labor demand.
I have argued that prediction markets dedicated to medium-term wage and productivity growth could
potentially provide accurate forecasts of labor demand.
I have focused exclusively on labor demand, but the wage bill, the tax base, and thus the viability of
the welfare state, ultimately depend on labor supply as well. Hours worked typically decrease with GDP
per capita, across countries as well as within countries over time (Bick, Fuchs-Schündeln, and Lagakos,
2018). Boppart and Krusell (forthcoming), who have inspired the title of this paper, explain these facts
23Occurrences of events that prediction markets considered to be unlikely, such as the outcome of the 2016 US presiden-
tial election, are not a refutation of prediction markets’ accuracy. Accuracy here means that out of 100 events that market
participants had judged to occur with a probability of five percent, five actually did happen.
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as resulting from stable preferences under steady productivity growth. That is, the income effect of
wage growth is (slightly) larger than its substitution effect. Lower wage growth then implies a slower
growth in leisure. On the other hand, labor force participation has trended downward recently in the
US, a trend that is only partially explained by changes in demographics. Abraham and Kearney (2018)
attribute much of this decline to lower wage growth due to changing labor demand. This of course implies
that the substitution effect dominates the income effect, contrary to Boppart and Krusell (forthcoming),
though more in line with Bick, Fuchs-Schündeln, and Lagakos (2018), who find that in rich countries, the
relationship between wages and hours is flat or even increasing. Alternative explanations for lower labor
force participation include an increased attractiveness of leisure (Aguiar, Bils, Charles, and Hurst, 2017)
and the increased availability of opioid drugs (Krueger, 2017). More research is needed to understand
how workers will adjust their hours in response to technology-driven changes in wages, and to assess the
importance of independent drivers of labor supply.
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Theory appendix
Here I formally state and derive the decomposition (6) developed by AR. In the multi-sector economy,
total value added (GDP) equals Y =∑i PiYi, where Pi and Yi are the price level and value added in industry
i. Sectoral value added shares are denoted by χi ≡ PiYi/Y . Sectoral factor levels and prices are Ni,Ki and
wi,ri, respectively. Sectoral wage bill shares are denoted by `i ≡ wiNi/(wN) and sectoral labor shares
are sN,i ≡ wiNi/(PiYi). The production function for sectoral output is given by (5). Since I carry out the
decomposition separately for each country, I omit the subscript c throughout this appendix. To keep the
notation light, I also omit the time subscript t.
Output markets are perfectly competitive, as are factor markets. However, no assumptions on factor
mobility are made, so that factor prices are allowed to vary across sectors. Profit maximization implies






























Formally, the decomposition (6) is written as









d log(1−αi). Change in task content
(A2)
The derivation of (A2) starts by noting that the economy-wide labor share sN ≡wN/Y equals the sum
over the products of sectoral value added and labor shares, and so wN =∑iY χisN,i. Totally differentiating
this equation yields




Y ×dχi× sN,i +∑
i
Y ×χi×dsN,i,

















Recalling that dx/x = d logx, it is clear that the first two terms after the equality sign make up the




wN ×dsN,i = ∑i `i×
dsN,i
sN,i
. Let xi ≡
ri/AK
wi/AN











and rearranging further (noting that sN,i αi1−αi x
1−σ

























Change in task content
.
The aggregate decomposition is obtained by computing the employment-weighted sum of the sectoral
decompositions.
The mapping from this decomposition of infinitesimal changes to one involving discrete changes that
can be implemented empirically involves a number of Taylor expansions, among other things. See the
online appendix of AR for details.
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Notes: The figures plot the results from the decomposition (6) which is due to Acemoglu and Restrepo (2019a). The labor
share used in the calculations is based on all labor earnings, including earnings of the self-employed.
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Labor share change in US industry
Notes: The figures plot changes in task content and labor shares 1987-2007 in 27 industries across five European countries
against changes in task content in the same industries in the US. Bubbles are scaled according to initial within-country employ-
ment shares. The fitted lines correspond to the regressions in column (3), panels A and B of Table 1.
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Labor share change in US industry
Notes: The figures plot changes in task content and labor shares 1987-2007 in 27 industries across five European countries
against changes in task content in the same industries in the US. Bubbles are scaled according to initial within-country employ-
ment shares. The fitted lines correspond to the regressions in column (3), panels A and B of Table A1.
Figure A3: Industry-level changes in labor share and task content, Europe versus the United States (all
labor)
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Table A1: Industry-level changes in labor share and task content, Europe versus the United States (all
labor)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Changes in task content
Change in US 0.41 0.23 0.24 0.22
(0.21) (0.093) (0.091) (0.085)
B. Changes in the labor share
Change in US 0.080 -0.027 0.020 0.014
(0.17) (0.10) (0.076) (0.073)
Outlier removed X X
Weighted by initial employment share X X
Observations 135 134 135 134
Notes: Results are shown from regressions of changes in task content and labor shares (all labor) 1987-2007 in 27 indus-
tries across five European countries against changes in task content in the same industries in the US. Robust standard errors,
clustered by industry, in parentheses.
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